Deployability of the IBCT in 96 Hours: Fact or Myth?, 2002 May 15
Information
Date
2002 May 15
Summary
The Interim Brigade Combat Team was designed to allow the Army to rapidly deploy a lethal and survivable force into contingency areas across the entire spectrum of conflict. With the IBCT, the Army plans to fill the gap between capability and deployability that currently exists between heavy and light forces. The IBCT was designed to be more lethal, survivable, and combat effective than a light brigade and more deployable than a heavy brigade. As a deployment yardstick in designing the IBCT, the Army has used 96 hours – the Chief of Staff, Army’s goal of having a brigade deploy anywhere in the world. To achieve this 96-hour goal the Army has designed the entire IBCT on being deployable by air. Because of airlift requirement for the IBCT, the brigade’s logistical structure is very austere. When deployed into an operational area, the unit will depend on reach-back systems for much of its logistical support. This additional logistical support must be integrated either before or during the flow of the IBCT personnel and equipment into a contingency area to ensure the brigade’s survivability and combat effectiveness. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the Army can deploy an IBCT in 96 hours. Since so much of the IBCT’s credibility rests on being able to rapidly deploy, it is necessary to test the feasibility of the brigade being deployed within 96 hours. If the Army cannot deploy the brigade in 96 hours, the service needs to determine ways to enhance the IBCT’s deployability. Furthermore, the author determined it necessary to examine sealift as a viable alternative to transporting the IBCT. Because of the brigade’s logistical austereness, sealift of additional stocks with the brigade’s organic equipment would enhance the unit’s survivability and combat effectiveness. Furthermore, in the Army’s design of this force, the author could not find any evidence that sealift had been tested as a viable alternative to airlift when deploying the IBCT. The author gathered empirical evidence of the deployment of the IBCT using the Joint Flow Analysis System (JFAST) simulation. A JFAST simulated deployment was conducted to the country of Rwanda using both sealift and airlift from a CONUS-based location. A time phased force deployment data list was created using the JFAST database that was comparable to the current IBCT in weight, size, and number of personnel. The results of the simulation showed that it was impossible for the brigade to deploy within 96 hours, and that the brigade could deploy more rapidly by sea than by air. The simulation showed that airlift deployment time would be in weeks, not hours. This was due to limited throughput capability at third world country airfields as being the major constraining factor preventing a 96 hour deployment by air. This is particularly relevant because third world countries are sites of the most likely contingency operations that will require the deployment of an IBCT. Based on the simulation results, the author recommends that the Army should rely on a combination of sealift and airlift in deploying the IBCT. The IBCT is too austere logistically, not to deploy additional stocks with organic units into a contingency area. These logistics either must be deployed before the IBCT or be integrated in the flow of IBCT personnel and equipment. A combination of sealift and airlift would deploy the IBCT into a contingency area more rapidly, more effectively use limited airlift assets, and ensure more survivability and combat effectiveness of the brigade. The Army should also explore the possibility of prepositioning an IBCT set of equipment afloat, since this would reduce sealift times from CONUS. Furthermore, the Army should stop advertising the 96-hour deployment goal, and instead focus on the fundamentals of modern deployment using both airlift and sealift.
Archival processing title
Deployability of the IBCT in 96 Hours: Fact or Myth?